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Abstract Experts’ remarkable ability to recall meaningful
domain-specific material is a classic result in cognitive psychol-
ogy. Influential explanations for this ability have focused on the
acquisition of high-level structures (e.g., schemata) or experts’
capability to process information holistically. However, research
on chess players suggests that experts maintain some reliable
memory advantage over novices when random stimuli (e.g.,
shuffled chess positions) are presented. This skill effect cannot
be explained by theories emphasizing high-level memory struc-
tures or holistic processing of stimuli, because random material
does not contain large structures norwholes. By contrast, theories
hypothesizing the presence of small memory structures—such as
chunks—predict this outcome, because some chunks still occur
by chance in the stimuli, even after randomization. The current
meta-analysis assessed the correlation between level of expertise
and recall of random material in diverse domains. The overall
correlation was moderate but statistically significant
(r ¼ :41; p < :001 ), and the effect was observed in nearly
every study. This outcome suggests that experts partly base their
superiority on a vaster amount of small memory structures, in
addition to high-level structures or holistic processing.
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A classic result in cognitive psychology is that experts have an
excellent memory for meaningful material taken from their do-
main of expertise, even when this material is presented only
briefly. This result was originally uncovered by De Groot’s
(1965) and Chase and Simon’s (1973) study of chess players,
and later replicated in many domains, including sports, science,
engineering, and games (see Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, &
Hoffman, 2006; Gobet, 2015, for overviews). Experts’ superior-
ity has often been explained by the acquisition of high-level
knowledge structures (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Cooke,
Atlas, Lane, & Berger, 1993; Holding & Pfau, 1985; Kalyuga,
Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003; Patel & Groen, 1986), or the
ability to process information holistically, unlike nonexperts who
have to process it piecemeal or analytically (Curby, Glazek, &
Gauthier, 2009; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Richler, Wong, &
Gauthier, 2011). High-level knowledge structures, such as sche-
mata and verbal concepts, abstract from the detail of the material
to memorize. For example, in chess, a complex position could be
summarized by the description Ban Italian opening, variation
Giuoco Pianissimo, withWhite’s pressure on the white squares.^
With holistic processing, it is assumed that the scene or object
being perceived is not decomposed into simpler units, but is
processed as a unified whole.
In a meta-analysis of 13 studies, Gobet and Simon (1996b)
showed that, at least with chess, these explanations were not
sufficient to explain experts’ superiority. They found that experts
maintained some superiority with random positions, in which
any high-level structure had been destroyed.With such positions,
experts’ advantage cannot be explained by the use of high-level
structures (by construction, these do not exist in random posi-
tions) nor by holistic processing (there is no whole to process
after the location of pieces has been randomized). Gobet and
Simon’s (1996b) result was predicted by computer simulations
based on the mechanism of chunking (Gobet & Simon, 1996a).
As proposed by Chase and Simon (1973), expertise in chess is
acquired by learning, through practice and study, a large number
of chunks, which are units of both perception and meaning; in
chess, chunks consist of constellations of pieces occurring often
together in masters’ games. Experts’ superiority with meaningful
* Giovanni Sala
Giovanni.sala@liv.ac.uk
1 Department of Psychological Sciences, Bedford Street South,
University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZA, UK
Mem Cogn
DOI 10.3758/s13421-016-0663-2
material (game positions in chess) is explained by their ability to
rapidly identify patterns present on the board, and retrieve chunks
from their long-termmemory (LTM). As shown by the computer
simulations, some patterns still occur, by chance, in random po-
sitions; as experts aremore likely to notice them due to their large
store of chunks, they can maintain some superiority. Importantly,
this superiority is not an artefact of the specific kind of random-
ization used, as proposed by Vicente and Wang (1998), because
it is maintainedwith positions obtainedwith different methods of
randomization (Gobet & Waters, 2003; Waters & Gobet, 2008).
Gobet and Simon’s (1996b) result is important theoretically,
as it can readily be explained by theories based on chunking,
such as chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 1973) and template
theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996c), but not by theories focusing on
high-level representations or holistic processing. However, it is
unknown whether this result generalizes to other domains of
expertise beyond chess. Therefore, the aim of this study was to
establish whether experts maintain some memory superiority
with random stimuli in different domains of expertise. Support
for this hypothesis would strongly corroborate theories based on
chunking.
The present meta-analysis
The present meta-analysis aimed to evaluate two predictions of
chunk-based theories on the recall of random material: (a) the
positive correlation between expertise and performance in
recalling domain-specific random material occurs regardless of
the particular domain, and thus is not specific to chess, and (b)
Search Features 
Searching electronic databases (ERIC, PsycInfo, Scopus, WorldCat, 
ProQuest Dissertation & Thesis databases) and Google Scholar 
Performing citation searches for key publications on chess memory recall 
(Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet & Simon, 1996b) 
Scanning previous narrative reviews 
Sending e-mail requests to authors requesting unpublished data 
Studies meeting the inclusion criteria and used for the calculation of the 
binomial probability (n = 45) 
55 independent samples and effect sizes 
Including N = 1,401 participants 
Studies reporting data to calculate the effect sizes and included in the meta-
analysis (n = 24) 
28 independent samples and effect sizes 
Including N = 903 participants 
Records After Duplicates Removed 
n = approx. 7,200 
Records Excluded 
n = approx. 5,300 
Abstract Screened 
n = approx. 1,900 
Abstracts Excluded 
n = approx. 1,460
Full-Text Articles Evaluated for 
Eligibility 
n = approx. 440 
Full-Text Articles 
Excluded 
n = approx. 395 
Fig. 1 Flow diagram of the studies considered and ultimately included for the calculation of the binomial probability analysis and the meta-analysis
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this skill effect is no more than moderate, because the number of
meaningful chunks in unstructured material is heavily reduced
after randomization. Thus, the skill effect is supposed to be rel-
atively modest in size.
To test these two hypotheses, a systematic search of articles
having used random material with experts and nonexperts was
carried out, and an overall correlation expressing the relationship
between expertise and the capacity of recalling random material
was calculated. Then, a moderator analysis was run to evaluate
whether the relationship between expertise and recall perfor-
mance of random material was present in every domain. To
evaluate the role of domain as moderator, the studies were cate-
gorized into five different domains: games, music, programming,
sports, and others.
The prediction of chunk-based theories applies primarily with
short presentation times, less than 8–10 seconds (time to create a
new chunk in LTM;Gobet& Simon, 2000; Simon, 1969), where
perceptual and short-term mechanisms dominate. As exposition
time varies with the type of material to recall (e.g., seconds for
game positions and music notes, minutes for computer pro-
grams), we also ran a moderator analysis to evaluate whether
the exposition time affected the effect size. Exposition time is
positively related to performance on the recall task with random-
ized chess positions (Gobet & Simon, 2000), but of course both
novices and experts can take advantage of prolonged time to use
alternative memory mechanisms (e.g., learning new chunks, se-
mantics) and thus be able to recall more items.
Finally, because several studies reported only the direction of
the effect (e.g., experts outperforming novices)without providing
data sufficient to calculate an effect size, we also calculated—
following the approach adopted in Gobet and Simon (1996b)—
the probability of k occurrences of the skill effect out of the total
number (n) of cases.
Method
Literature search
In line with the PRISMA statement (Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff,
& Altman, 2009), a systematic search strategy was used to
find relevant studies (see Fig. 1 for a summary of the proce-
dure). Using several combinations of the terms recall, ran-
dom, scrambled, unstructured, shuffled, and meaningless,
we searched ERIC, PsycInfo, Scopus, WorldCat, ProQuest
Dissertation & Thesis databases, and Google Scholar to iden-
tify all the potential relevant studies. In addition, previous
narrative reviews were examined, and we e-mailed re-
searchers in the field (n = 13) asking them for unpublished
studies and data. Finally, we performed citation searches for
two publications: Chase and Simon (1973) and Gobet and
Simon (1996b).
Inclusion/exclusion criteria
The studies were included according to the following seven
criteria:
1. The domain of expertise studied did not entail training
memory per se; for example, memory experts using mne-
monics (e.g., in the digit-span task), were excluded.
2. A measure of performance in a recall task was collected.
3. Some kind of random material was used.
4. The task was performed by participants with different
levels of expertise (e.g., years of practice, categories, or
Elo points).
5. Novices were not totally unfamiliar with the material to
recall.1
6. The random material was obtained by shuffling all the
elements (e.g., chess pieces, lines of programs) of struc-
tured material. No partially randomized material was
considered.
7. The data presented were sufficient to establish the direc-
tion of the effect (e.g., experts better than novices) or,
better, to calculate an effect size.
We found 45 studies conducted from January 1973 to
March 2015 meeting the above criteria, including 1,401 par-
ticipants, and 55 independent samples. These were included in
a binomial distribution analysis. The 24 studies reporting suf-
ficient data to calculate an effect size were included in a meta-
analysis, and included 903 participants, 28 independent sam-
ples, and 28 effect sizes2 (see Table 1).
Effect sizes
As a measure of effect size, we used the correlation between
expertise in a domain and performance in recalling random
material. Two studies reported a correlation coefficient, which
we used. When group-level comparisons (e.g., novices vs.
experts) were reported (k = 26), we converted Cohen’s ds3 to
point biserial correlation (Schmidt & Hunter, 2015). Artificial
dichotomization was corrected for the effect sizes extrapolated
1 In Sloboda’s (1976) first experiment, the novice group consisted of four
undergraduates with little or no musical training. However, the material
consisted of cards with dots drawn on five lines (representing the musical
stave). Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that such stimuli were also fa-
miliar to those participants who had no experience of music reading.
2 Some study reported the results of several trials. In these cases, we used
the data from the first trial or, if no separate results were provided, the
participants’ overall average. This procedure was adopted to rule out,
where possible, potential confounds such as training and testing effects,
and to not violate the statistical independence of the samples.
3 As suggested by Schmidt and Hunter (2015), when the sample was less
than 20 participants, Cohen’s ds were corrected for upward bias (Hedges
& Olkin, 1985) and then converted into point biserial correlations.
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from group-level comparisons only in chess studies, because
only the field of chess—among the ones considered in the
present meta-analysis—has a continuous variable assessing
expertise (Elo, 1978).
Moderators
The two potential moderators were as follows:
1. Domain (categorical variable): This variable includes
games, music, programming, sports and others.
2. Time of exposition (dichotomous variable): The time of
exposition (in seconds) to the material to recall was more
than 8 seconds or less or equal than 8 seconds.
Results
Meta-analysis
A random model (k = 28) was built to calculate the overall
correlation. The overall correlation was r = .41, 95 % CI [.29;
.51], p < .001 (see Fig. 2). The degree of heterogeneity be-
tween effect sizes was I2 = 63.06, suggesting potential mod-
erator effects.
Moderator analyses We ran a moderator analysis to evaluate
Domain as potential moderator. Domain was amarginally signif-
icant moderator, Q(4) = 8.69, p = .069, k = 28. The correlations
were r = .42, 95 % CI [.25, .56], p < .001, k = 11, for games; r =
Table 1 Summary of the 28 samples included in the meta-analysis
Study N Domain Description of the
random material
Time of exposition
to the stimulus (in
seconds)a
Adelson (1981) 10 Programming Lines of programs presented in a random order 20
Barfield (1986) 22 Programming Lines of programs presented in a random order 300
Bateson, Alexander, and Murphy (1987) 50 Programming Lines of programs presented in a random order 180
Charness (1979) 20 Games (Bridge) Unstructured bridge hands 5
Chiesi, Spilich, and Voss (1979) 42 Sport (Baseball) Random sentence presentation order of baseball
events
not given
Engle and Bukstel (1978) 4 Games (Bridge) Unstructured bridge hands 20
Gerard (1998) 100 Other (Diagrams) Diagrams with labels randomized 180
Gobet and Simon (1996c) 13 Games (Chess) Shuffled chess positions 5
Gobet and Simon (2000) 20 Games (Chess) Shuffled chess positions 15
Gobet and Waters (2003) 36 Games (Chess) Shuffled chess positions 5
Gong, Ericsson, and Moxley (2015) 23 Games (Chess) Shuffled chess positions 5
Guerin and Matthews (1990) 104 Programming Lines of programs presented in a random order 600
Holding and Reynolds (1982) 24 Games (Chess) Shuffled chess positions 8
Kalakoski and Saariluoma (2001) 16 Other (Taxi
drivers)
Random auditory presentation of streets not given
Knecht (2003) 20 Music Shuffled notes in a musical stave not given
Magliaro and Burton (1986) 16 Programming Lines of programs presented in a random order 120
Nakatani and Yamaguchi (2014) 24 Games (Shogi) Shuffled shogi positions 5
Pezzulo, Borghi, Barca, and Bocconi (2010) 6 Sport (Climbing) Impossible routes on a climbing wall not given
Schmidt (1986) 20 Programming Lines of programs presented in a random order 4
Schneider, Gruber, Gold, and Opwis
(1993)—S1
40 Games (Chess) Shuffled chess positions 10
Schneider, Gruber, Gold, and Opwis
(1993)—S2
40 Games (Chess) Shuffled chess positions 10
Schultetus and Charness (1999) 17 Games (Chess) Shuffled chess positions 8
Sloboda, (1976)—S1 8 Music Shuffled notes in a musical stave 2
Sloboda, (1976)—S2 8 Music Shuffled notes in a musical stave 0.075
Sloboda, (1976)—S3 10 Music Shuffled notes in a musical stave 2
Sloboda, (1976)—S4 10 Music Shuffled notes in a musical stave 2
Weber and Brewer (2003) 48 Sport (Hockey) Shuffled sentences of play from hockey matches 50.6
Zhilin and Tkachuk (2013) 152 Other (Chemistry) Random sequences of chemical symbols 30
a When the study presented only the overall performance of several trials, the mean time of exposition was reported in the table
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.69, 95 % CI [.35, .86], p < .001, k = 5, for music; r = .36, 95 %
CI [.21, .49], p < .001, k = 6, for programming; r = .30, 95 % CI
[-.04, .58], p = .083, k = 3, for sports; and r = .24, 95 % CI [-.09,
.52], p = .154, k = 3, for other domains. The music-related cor-
relationwas slightly superior to the other four overall correlations
(b = 0.62, z = 2.85, p = .004).
We also performed a moderator analysis to test whether Time
of exposition significantly affected the effect sizes. No significant
effect was found, Q(1) = 0.89, p = .346, k = 24.
Publication bias Publication bias occurs when experiments
showing weak results are systematically excluded from the liter-
ature when the sample sizes are small. To test whether our results
were affected by publication bias, we created a funnel plot
depicting the relation between Fisher’s Z and standard error
and performed Duval and Tweedie’s (2000) trim-and-fill
analysis.
The funnel plot depicting the relationship between
Standard Error and Fisher’s Z value looked asymmetrical.
The trim-and-fill analysis showed the presence of publi-
cation bias. Eight studies were trimmed and the estimate
overall correlation was r = .29, 95 % CI [.17, .41]. The
funnel plot including both the studies in this meta-analysis
and the filled in ones is shown in Fig. 3. Finally, the fail-
safe N—that is, the number of missing studies with effect
equal to zero necessary to make the observed effect (r = .41)
nonsignificant (p > .05)—was calculated, and found to be 745.
Sensitivity analysis Two studies included in the meta-analysis
presented some methodological issues. As mentioned earlier,
Sloboda’s (1976) first experiment included an unspecified num-
ber of participants with no music training in the novice group.
This condition partly violates one of the inclusion criteria. Also,
in Knecht (2003), the novice group did not correctly recall any
item (i.e., mean = 0). Although this condition did not violate any
of the inclusion criteria, such an unusually poor performance in
the novice group might have inflated the effect size.
A sensitivity analysis was thus performed to test the robust-
ness of the results by excluding the two effect sizes. A random
model (k = 26) was built to calculate the overall correlation. The
overall correlation was r = .39, 95 % CI [.28, .50], p < .001, I2 =
64.15. Regarding publication bias, the point estimate was r = .28,
95%CI [.15, .40], with seven effect missing sizes filled in left of
the mean.
No significant effect was found for either of the two
moderators (p = .116 and p = .420 for Domain and Time
of exposition, respectively). The music-related correlation
was still slightly superior to the other four overall corre-
lations (b = 0.74, z = 2.56, p = .010).
Fig. 2 Overall correlation (r ) for skill effect in recalling random
material. Correlation coefficients (circles) and 95 % CIs (lines) are
displayed for all effects entered into the meta-analysis. The diamond at
bottom represents the meta-analytically weighted correlation coefficient
(r ). For studies with multiple independent samples, the result of each
sample (S1, S2, etc.) is reported separately
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Binomial distribution analysis
The 45 studies included 55 experiments; in 49 cases, the experts
outperformed the novices (for a list of the articles, see Table 2 in
AppendixA andAppendixB). Assuming a binomial distribution
with a probability of success (i.e., experts performing better than
the novices) of .50, n = 55, and k = 49, the probability of
obtaining at least 49 successes out of 55 is p = 9.11 × 10-10.
Discussion
The results presented in our meta-analysis suggest that experts
keep an advantage even when they recall random material; this
skill effect is not limited to one specific domain (e.g., chess), but is
common to nearly every kind of material, with only sports and
Bother domains^ failing to reach statistical significance. In addi-
tion, the overall correlation was significant but no more thanmod-
erate.4 This outcome corroborates the hypothesis according to
which human memory mechanisms are in part based on small
memory structures (such as chunks), which are stored in LTM
(Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet & Simon, 2000). Experts—who
have access tomanymore of these structures than do novices—are
more likely to recognize the patterns that accidentally emerge after
domain-specificmaterial is randomized. As previouslymentioned,
theories of expert memory focusing on high-level structures or
holistic processing of stimuli (e.g. Holding & Pfau, 1985;
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986) cannot explain this result, because the
structures they postulate cannot be used with random stimuli.
Moderator effects
The moderator analysis showed that the skill effect was more
than moderate only with musicians (r = .69). This seems to be
an empirical anomaly. As suggested byGobet andWaters (2003)
and Knecht (2003), the skill effect is inversely related to the
degree of randomness of the material to recall, and it is reason-
able to assume that music-related materials used in recall tasks
had a lower degree of randomness. For example, the task used in
Sloboda’s (1976) experiments consisted of recalling only five
notes presented inside a musical stave, with nine possible posi-
tions (five lines and four spaces) for every note. Therefore, the
number of possible combinations that could have been obtained
by randomizing those musical notes was far lesser than—for
instance—random chess positions, which usually contained
20–25 pieces placed on 64 possible squares. Thus, the greater
skill effect in the domain of music was probably due to the low
degree of randomness of thematerial used in the studies included
in the meta-analysis, and not to some other feature specific to the
field of music.
Finally, the time of exposition of the stimuli exerted no
significant influence on the effect sizes. This outcome sug-
gests that no other memory mechanism—such as encoding
new chunks or using semantics—was uniquely used by the
experts during the recall of the unstructured material. It is
likely that additional time allows both novices and experts to
learn new long-term memory chunks (e.g., Gobet & Simon,
2000). Consistent with this hypothesis, the effect was stronger
in musicians (r = .69) and games players (r = .42)—who were
4 The effect sizes for meaningful domain-specific material are about 40%
to 50% greater than the overall effect sizes reported for unstructured
material. For example, the point-biserial correlation for structured mate-
rial is r = .87 in Knecht (2003), and r = 0.61 in Gobet and Simon (2000).
Fig. 3 Funnel plot of standard errors and effect sizes (Fischer’s Z). The
white circles represent the studies included in the meta-analysis and the
black circles represent the filled-in studies. The white diamond indicates
the overall correlation estimated from the studies included in the meta-
analysis, and the black diamond indicates the overall correlation estimat-
ed by the trim-and-fill analysis
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exposed just for a few seconds to the stimuli—than in pro-
grammers (r = .36)—who had up to 10 minutes.
It is worth noting that the lack of effect for the presentation
time moderator is different from what Gobet and Simon
(2000) found: with random positions, the slope of recall in-
crease was slightly larger for masters than for candidate mas-
ters and Class A players, a result that was accurately simulated
by their computer model. However, the differences were
small, as indicated by the parameter c in their Tables 1 and 3.
Whether this result generalizes to other domains should be
investigated in further experiments, where the presentation
time of the stimuli is systematically varied. In the current me-
ta-analysis, the presentation time is confounded with domain.
Limitations of the study
The present meta-analysis has four limitations that merit dis-
cussion. First, the total number of studies (N = 24) and partic-
ipants (N = 903) was relatively small. As a consequence, it
was not possible to carry out moderator analyses on variables
such as age, gender, or expertise level. However, we note that
the skill effect was present in nearly all the studies excluded
for not providing enough data to calculate an effect size.
Those studies often reported not only that randomization re-
duced the skill effect in the recall task but also that experts
kept a small advantage over novices when recalling random
material, which is in line with our main analysis.
Second, and linked to the first limitation, the presence of
publication bias suggests that the overall correlation we calculat-
ed (r = .41) is probably an overestimation. Nonetheless, the value
estimated by the trim-and-fill analysis (r = .29) is still statistically
significant, and both values suggest that the skill effect in
recalling random material is significant, but at best moderate, a
result consistent with the chunking hypothesis. Moreover, the
high number (N = 745) of studies estimated by the fail-safe
analysis and the low probability (p = 9.11 × 10-10) estimated by
the binomial analysis suggest that the skill effect we found is a
genuine result.
Third, the randomization methods varied from domain to do-
main, most likely a necessity as they depend on the structure of a
specific domain. In addition, different methods can be used in a
single domain. Although this weakness was unavoidable, further
research should systematically investigate different methods of
randomization in a domain, testing the predictions of a formal
model. For example, most studies on chess memory followed
Chase and Simon’s method, where pieces from a game position
are randomly reassigned to a new square. Gobet and Waters
(2003) and Waters and Gobet (2008) explored different methods,
including selecting pieces with the same probability, and used the
empirical data to test the prediction of CHREST, a chunked-based
model.
Finally, we could not correct for measurement error because
only five studies provided reliability coefficients for the recall
tasks. Moreover, among the domains considered in our meta-
analysis, only chess (to the best of our knowledge) uses a rating
system (Elo, 1978), whose reliability coefficient has been calcu-
lated (r = .91; Hambrick et al., 2014). In any case, this limitation
does not invalidate themain outcome of themeta-analysis, which
is that a moderate skill effect in the recall task still remains even
with randommaterial, and that this phenomenon applies to nearly
every domain considered.
Conclusions
The results presented in this meta-analysis show that a skill
effect occurs in recall tasks even when the domain-specific ma-
terial to recall is unstructured. This outcome lends support to the
hypothesis according to which human memory mechanisms are
in part based on small memory structures such as chunks.
Larger, schema-like structures are gradually built on chunks as
a function of the exposure to frequent objects and scenes in the
environment (Gobet & Chassy, 2009; Gobet & Simon, 1996c).
Conversely, theories of expert memory based only on high-level
knowledge structures such as schemata or holistic processing
cannot explain a skill effect in recalling random material.
One possible alternative explanation is that experts try to
recall more items (e.g., chess pieces, music notes) than do nov-
ices. To test this hypothesis, Charness and Schultetus (1999)
analyzed the performance of chess players in the recall task and
controlled for errors of commissions (pieces placed incorrectly).
The results showed that the expert chess players (i.e., Elo rating
>1999) still outperformed the group of novices.
Another alternative explanation is that experts outper-
form novices because of their superior working memory
(WM; Meinz & Hambrick, 2010). Because individuals
whose WM capacity is greater are more likely to acquire
expertise in their field, the skill effect we observed might
be due to experts’ superior ability to retain elements in
WM, and not necessarily to experts’ vaster amount of
chunks stored in their LTM. Although further research is
needed to test this and other alternative explanations, the
greater average age of the experts compared to novices in
many of the reviewed studies (e.g., Barfield, 1986; Guerin
& Matthews, 1990; Kalakoski & Saariluoma, 2001;
Knecht, 2003; Sloboda, 1976) militates against it. The
acquisition of expertise is a relatively long process, and
thus experts tend to be older than novices (Lehman,
1953). Because WM efficiency decreases as a function
of age (Birren & Schaie, 1996), it is unlikely that experts’
advantage at recalling random material is only due to WM
ability. Consistent with this hypothesis, a recent meta-
analysis (Moxley & Charness, 2013) has shown that per-
formance on the recall of chess positions is negatively
associated with age, but positively associated with chess
skill. Therefore, experts’ superior ability to recognize
Mem Cogn
small chunks occurring by chance in random material is
the most likely explanation.
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Appendix A
Table 2 The 45 studies (55 samples) included in the binomial distribution analysis
Study N Domain Included in the meta-analysis Skill effect
Abernethy, Neal, and Konig (1994) 29 Sports (snooker) No No
Adelson (1981) 10 Programming Yes Yes
Barfield (1986) 22 Programming Yes Yes
Bateson, Alexander, and Murphy (1987) 50 Programming Yes Yes
Beal (1985) 20 Music No Yes
Charness (1979) 20 Games (bridge) Yes No
Chase and Simon (1973) 3 Games (chess) No No
Chiesi, Spilich, and Voss (1979) 42 Sports (baseball) Yes Yes
Cole (1991) 38 Sports (basket) No Yes
Coughlin and Patel (1987) 32 Other (medicine) No Yes
Egan and Schwartz (1979) 12 Other (symbolic drawings) Yes No
Engle and Bukstel (1978) 4 Games (bridge) Yes Yes
Frey and Adesman (1976) 13 Games (chess) No Yes
Garland and Barry (1991) 80 Sports (football) No Yes
Gerard (1998) 100 Other (REA diagrams) Yes Yes
Gobet and Clarkson (2004) 12 Games (chess) No Yes
Gobet and Simon (1996a) 25 Games (chess) No Yes
Gobet and Simon (1996b) 13 Games (chess) Yes Yes
Gobet and Simon (2000) 20 Games (chess) Yes Yes
Gobet and Waters (2003) 36 Games (chess) Yes Yes
Gold and Opwis (1992) 40 Games (chess) No Yes
Gong, Ericsson, and Moxley (2015) 23 Games (chess) Yes Yes
Guerin and Matthews (1990) 104 Programming Yes Yes
Hodge (1997) 20 Sports (martial arts) No Yes
Holding and Reynolds (1982) 24 Games (chess) Yes Yes
Knecht (2003) 20 Music Yes Yes
Lories (1987) 19 Games (chess) No Yes
Magliaro and Burton (1986) 16 Programming Yes Yes
Nakatani and Yamaguchi (2014) 24 Games (shogi) Yes Yes
Norman, Brooks, and Allen (1989) 11 Other (medicine) No No
Pezzulo, Borghi, Barca, and Bocconi (2010) 6 Sports (climbing) Yes Yes
Reitman (1976) 2 Games (go) No Yes
Saariluoma (1984) (Exp. 3) 4 Games (chess) No Yes
Saariluoma (1984) (Exp. 4) 4 Games (chess) No Yes
Saariluoma (1985) 9 Games (chess) No Yes
Saariluoma (1989) (Exp. 1) 8 Games (chess) No Yes
Saariluoma (1989) (Exp. 2) 6 Games (chess) No Yes
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Appendix B
List of the studies included in the binomial distribution
analysis
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